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483 
PRICE-CAP REGULATION: THE ANSWER TO 
CHINA’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
COMPETITION DILEMMA 
INTRODUCTION 
China had the largest global cellular phone market as of January 2002, 
and the second largest global fixed-line market as of November 2001. 
China is currently the fastest-growing major telecommunications market.1 
Despite the sheer size and potential of the market, regulation of the 
telecommunications industry in China is underdeveloped by Western 
standards. This lack of development carries over to Chinese regulatory 
agencies, laws, and market experience. Since the early 1990s China has 
made a concerted effort to modernize its telecommunications market and 
regulatory infrastructure. This effort included breaking the 
telecommunications monopoly of China Telecom and creating a viable 
regulatory agency.2 In 2000, with its WTO entry looming, China enacted 
its first telecommunications regulations, which mirrored the WTO 
requirements imposed by the international community.3 The 2000 law, 
 
 
 1. China Plans Four Integrated Telecom Operators to Spur Competition, AGENCE-FRANCE-
PRESSE, Jan. 8, 2002, at 1, available at Global News-bank, Record No. 0F0EC211B525EF12.  
China has emerged as the world’s largest cell phone market, with 140 million mobile 
subscribers in late November 2001, an increase of 64% from early 2001. The country’s 177 
million fixed-line users as of November [2001] up 23% from the beginning of last year, also 
contributed to its position as the planet’s fastest growing major market for 
telecommunications. 
Id.  
 2. John Y. Lo & Charles C.K. Poon, China, in THE DEACONS’ GUIDE TO 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN ASIA 85, 85 (Ralph Cunningham ed., 2001).  
In 1995, the State Council, the top body in the executive branch of the Chinese Government, 
approved the basic concept of separating the telecom regulatory function from the service 
operation. The separation process was implemented by reform at the ministerial level in 1998 
when a new regulatory body known as the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) was 
established. The MII is a government ministry directly responsible to the State Council. It is 
responsible for the management of three key industries: telecommunications (including 
broadcasting infrastructure), electronics and information products manufacturing, and 
software. 
Id.  
 3. See id. at 97.  
As a result of the significant restructuring of China’s telecommunications market in recent 
years, China’s aspiration to join the WTO and its committment to comply with the latter’s 
requirements, telecommunications regulation in China is entering an active phase. The 
promulgation of the [Telecommunications] Regulations in September 2000 marked China’s 
first attempt at regulating telecom industry in a comprehensive, albeit somewhat crude, 
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however, is merely a simplified, short-term solution, and many scholars 
believe China will draft a comprehensive regulatory law.4 
With the creation of a second market participant in the 1990s, China 
Unicom, the Chinese telecommunications sector began to shift from a 
monopolistic environment to a more competitive one. Although the 
government has tried to break up China Telecom, the major fixed-line 
provider, it has struggled to establish consistent and comprehensive 
national pricing standards.5 The inconsistent pricing standards have 
hindered improvements in service quality, product offerings, and 
predatory pricing.6  
The United Kingdom’s telecommunications price regulations provide a 
model that China should implement. British telecommunications 
regulation did not exist until 1980,7 and the government achieved 
significant institutional change from 1980 to 1984.8 The government 
established a new regulatory regime by creating the Office of 
Telecommunications (OFTEL) and allowing a second telecommunications 
provider, Mercury, to compete with British Telecom (BT), the previous 
monopoly provider.9 The government also devised a way to address BT’s 
 
 
manner. Subsequent subsidiary regulations will likely fill many of the voids left by the 
Regulations. 
Id. 
 4. Id.  See generally Laura B. Sherman, The Impact of China’s WTO Entry on the 
Telecommunications and IT Sectors, 817 PLI/Comm 207 (2001). Following its accession to the WTO, 
the telecommunications sector has undergone significant change and further regulations are necessary 
for full WTO compliance. Id.  
 5. Kenneth J. DeWoskin, The WTO and the Telecommunications Sector in China, 167 THE 
CHINA Q. 630, 645 (2001). “The state has struggled with pricing issues for years in the competition 
between China Mobile and Unicom, more recently in wireless competition between China Mobile and 
China Telecom, and most recently in collapsing prices for international service over the Internet…” Id. 
at 645. See also Fod Barnes, Regulating Telecommunications, in COMPETITION IN REGULATED 
INDUSTRIES 215 (Dieter Helm & Tim Jenkinson eds., 1998).  
In a market where competition is developing, but not fully established, competition cannot be 
relied upon to stop excessive prices, but within that constraint there is no obvious reason why 
the pattern of prices should not be left up to the supplier, subject to the normal rules on anti-
competitive behavior.  
Id. 
 6. Barnes, supra note 5, at 215. China Telecom responded to the entry entrance of China 
Unicom, its main competitor with predatory price reductions. Id.  
 7. MICHAEL PALMER & JEREMY TUNSTALL, LIBERATING COMMUNICATIONS 263 (NCC 
Blackwell, 1990). During the 1970s, the United Kingdom endured a nationalized industrial period. Id. 
Deregulation in the 1980s somewhat broadened this policy. Id.  
 8. MARK THATCHER, THE POLITICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 148 (Oxford University Press, 
1999). 
 9. Id. at 148–49. The 1984 Telecommunications Act “abolished British Telecom’s monopoly 
over telecommunications systems” and created the office of Director of General Telecommunications, 
which was responsible for the enforcement of licenses. Id. at 148–49. See also Telecommunications 
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monopoly power in pricing.10 The United Kingdom decided to follow an 
incentive-based pricing scheme, known as the “price-cap,” which regulates 
local and long-distance service prices to promote greater market 
efficiency.11 
Part I of this Note provides a brief historical overview of the 
telecommunications industry in China and the United Kingdom. Part II 
analyzes and compares issues of telecommunications regulation and 
competition in both China and the United Kingdom, and pricing and 
regulatory schemes for telephone services. Part III demonstrates how 
applying the British model for telecommunications pricing can positively 
affect the telecommunications industry in China. This Note proposes that 
China should concurrently implement the British policy for pricing 
telephone services and its pro-competition regulatory reforms in order to 
promote greater efficiency in the Chinese telecommunications sector.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. China 
Six corporations now share the Chinese telecommunications market: 
China Telecom (the largest participant), China Unicom, China Netcom, 
China Mobile, China Satcom, and China Railcom.12 Despite the existence 
of the other telecommunications corporations, China Telecom is the 
traditional dominant actor and has the largest customer base.13 A recent 
telecommunications structural reform plan divided the former China 
 
 
Act of 1984, ch. 12 (Eng.). “An act to provides the appointment and functions of the Director General 
of Telecommunications; to abolish British Telecommunications’ exclusive privilege with respect to the 
provision of telecommunications services and certain related services.” Id. 
 10. INGO VOGELSANG & BRIDGET M. MITCHELL, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION 266 
(1997). Though some parts of the telecommunications market could reasonably foster competition, 
there were other sectors where BT’s monopoly was unassailable (such as basic local and long-distance 
telephone service). Id.  
 11. Id. at 267. The incentive-based pricing scheme was based on Sir Alan Walters’ “output 
related profits levy” (ORPL) scheme. Id. “The scheme defined a basket of regulated services whose 
prices on average would be allowed to grow at the rate of inflation minus an unspecified adjustment 
factor (X). Inflation would be measured by the retail price index (RPI).” Id. See also J.R. 
NORSWORTHY & S.L. JANG, EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTIVITY AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 8 (D.W. Jorgenson & J. Laffont eds., Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. 
1992). “Productivity is an economic concept: it is the ratio of output to input. Efficiency, a concept 
based on physical science, is also a ratio of output to input measured in physical units.” Id. 
 12. China’s Telecommunications Reform Nears Completion, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (May 16, 
2002), at 1, available at Global News Bank, Record No. 0F39A07FB276D137.  
 13. Lo & Poon, supra note 2, at 88. China Telecom went through a series of “restructurings.” Id. 
Its predecessor was the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), which had acted as both the 
regulator and operator of telecommunications services in China.” Id.  
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Telecom trunk line transmission network into southern and northern 
parts.14 Under the revised structure, China Netcom will hold thirty percent 
of the national trunk line, and China Telecom will hold the remaining 
seventy percent.15  
In preparation for its WTO accession in November of 2001, China 
progressed in adjusting its internal telecommunications regulation to 
include ownership restructuring and operational restructuring.16 This 
restructuring established an independent regulator to supervise a changing 
market that included new entrants and the duopoly of China Telecom and 
China Netcom.17 That independent regulator is the Ministry of Information 
Industry (MII), established in 1998,18 which manages and plans 
telecommunications networks and regulates the telecommunications 
industry.19  
Before 2000, China followed a piecemeal approach to 
telecommunications regulation, which did not adequately manage the 
increasingly complex landscape of the developing telecommunications 
 
 
 14. See China’s Telecommunications Reform Nears Completion, supra note 12, at 1. See also 
Eric Sautede, Telecoms in China: Towards a Post-WTO Shock Therapy?, CHINA PERSPECTIVES, 
May/June 2002, at 41. 
Since May 16th, 2002, China Telecom has thus split into two: its activities in 21 southern and 
western provinces remain under the banner of China Telecom Group (33.8% of the overall 
revenue of telecoms) and its activities in ten northern provinces passes to China Netcom 
Group (17.2% of overall revenue in 2001) by incorporating the activities of Netcom Corp. as 
a subsidiary (Internet access and high-speed data transfer) and those of Jitong (2nd satellite 
network, 2nd Internet network and telephone business via the Internet).  
Id.  
 15. See China’s Telecommunications Reform Nears Completion, supra note 12, at 1. 
The new China Telecom Corporation [will] maintain business in 21 provinces and cities in 
southern and northwestern China and hold 70 percent of the national trunk line transmission 
network assets owned by the former China Telecom. The 10 northern provincial corporations 
of the former China Telecom including those in the provinces of Henan, Shandong, and 
Northeastern provinces, together with the former China Netcom and Jitong Communications 
Corporation, merged in the new China Netcom Communication Group Consolidation Group 
Corporation [China Netcom], holding 30 percent of the national trunk line transmission 
network assets. Both new corporations have now become two fixed line telephone network 
enterprises with equal capacity in China’s telecommunications market. The two companies 
both have complete domestic long-distance trunk transmission networks and local telephone 
networks in their own areas and they are also allowed to build and operate local telephone 
networks in each other’s areas.  
Id.  
 16. See DeWoskin, supra note 5, at 637. This type of reform has been a global trend since the 
breakup of the AT&T monopoly in the United States in the mid-1980s. Id.  
 17. Id. The existence of an independent “regulator make[s] it possible for new entrants to 
establish commercially viable market positions and shares.” Id. 
 18. See Lo & Poon, supra note 2, at 85-86.  
 19. Id. Operators are required to seek approval and obtain an operational license from the MII. 
Id. at 92. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/16
p483 Yee book pages.doc  2/11/2004   
 
 
 
 
 
2004] CHINA’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS 487 
 
 
 
 
sector.20 The issuance of the Telecommunications Regulations (“The 
Regulations”) in 2000 was a significant starting point for developing 
comprehensive legislation.21 The Regulations outline distinct licensing 
regimes for the operators of basic telecommunications services and those 
of value-added services.22 The Regulations also outline competitive 
safeguards, which state that MII will impartially foster competition and 
prohibit anti-competitive acts or methods in the telecommunications 
industry.23  
Interconnection is an intricate part of increased competition in the 
telecommunications industry because new operators must use the trunk 
line of the existing main provider.24 To effectively implement 
interconnection, operators must negotiate an agreement with the main 
provider, if not, a mediating authority will impose a mandatory connection 
agreement.25 The Regulations mandate that “cost” to the 
telecommunications service provider is the basis of telecommunications 
service pricing, taking into account other factors such as the development 
of the economy, the telecommunications industry, and the ability of 
customers to afford subscriptions.26 The “cost” figure is formulated by 
cost data reported by telecommunications operators, and hearings by the 
government, telecommunications operators, and subscribers.27  
B. The United Kingdom 
The 1984 Telecommunications Act (“the Act”) instituted significant 
changes in the telecommunications landscape of the United Kingdom, 
including the privatization of BT, the end of BT’s statutory monopoly, a 
new licensing regime, and the creation of a “separate regulator.”28 “The 
Act transformed BT into a private limited company and allowed for the 
 
 
 20. Id at 89. The few regulations assembled on telecommunications were an incomplete 
patchwork of fragmented pieces. Id.  
 21. Id. at 90. The Regulations are broad-based and cover the important areas of 
telecommunications regulations. Id.  
 22. Id. at 91.  
 23. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dianxin tiaoli [Telecommunications Regulations], art. 25, in 
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyvan gongbao [State Council Gazette] No. 3, 11 (2000) 
[hereinafter “PBC Telecommunications Regulations”]. 
 24. See Lo & Poon, supra note 2, at 93. 
 25. PRC Telecommunications Regulations, at art. 19. See also id. art. 20. For a definition of 
interconnection, see Barnes, supra note 5, at 214.  
 26. PRC Telecommunications Regulations, art. 23.  
 27. Id. art. 26.  
 28. See THATCHER, supra note 8, at 148.  
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sale of shares by the government.”29 OFTEL assumed the central role of 
telecommunications regulator and began to break away from BT by 
developing a specialized expertise in telecommunications regulation.30 
OFTEL’s two main goals were to promote competition and develop 
incentive-based regulation.31  
To further OFTEL’s first goal, promoting competition, the Act 
mandated full interconnection between BT’s network and Mercury.32 
OFTEL further stimulated competition by mandating that BT base its 
tariffs for use of BT’s network upon an OFTEL formula rather than BT’s 
public tariffs.33 By the 1990s, OFTEL changed from a promoter of 
competition to a competition authority.34 “OFTEL’s regulatory powers are 
officially vested in a single regulator, the Director General,” who 
facilitates policy without the interference of Parliament.35  
The 1984 Act provided the framework for the government’s so-
called “duopoly policy.” The policy mandated that competition for 
fixed network services would be limited to a duopoly for a period of 
at least seven years. The duopoly policy also imposed a range of 
restrictions on the nature of activities that could be conducted by 
persons other than the two duopolists.36 
 
 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 174, 175.  
 31. See id. at 174. 
[OFTEL] had two main “legs”. The first was promoting “effective competition” as the highest 
priority for oftel, from the list of duties specified in § 3 of the Telecommunications Act 1984. 
Oftel claimed that competition would benefit consumers and was compatible with its other 
duties. The second “leg” was developing “incentive regulation.” It applied where competition 
was not possible and involved establishing a regulatory framework that “mimicked” a 
competitive market, seeking to produce similar incentives and pressures to those offered by 
competition.  
Id. 
 32. Id. at 178–79. After BT and Mercury failed to negotiate the terms of interconnection between 
their networks, OFTEL made a determination in favor of competition. Id. at 178. “There should be full 
interconnection between the two networks, so that any person could call any other person, and any 
customer should be able to choose which network carried his call, even if this meant that BT’s local 
network was used at both ends and Mercury’s network only for the trunk section.” Id. at 178-79. 
 33. See id. “The tariffs charged by BT for use of its network should be based on its costs plus a 
percentage determined by OFTEL, not BT’s public tariffs, greatly assisting the economic viability of 
competition.” Id. at 179. 
 34. Id. at 209. “With the extension of competition in the 1990s, OFTEL modified its stated 
purpose, seeking to become a ‘competition authority.’” Id.  
 35. Sean P. Farrell, Telecommunications in the United Kingdom, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 321, 334 (1996); see also Telecommunications Act, 1984, Ch. 12, § 1 (Eng.). 
 36. Farrell, supra note 35, at 328. 
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Mercury Communications was named the company to share the 
network with BT.37  
“BT’s share of the residential market has steadily decreased since 
1991.”38 Despite its loss in market share, BT continues to innovate and to 
keep up with current technology, while cutting rates and improving 
service.39  
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Competition Policy 
Policies such as the division of China Telecom and the introduction of 
China Unicom are indicators that China is committed to generating greater 
competition in the telecommunications sector, but realizing that 
competition will be an entirely different matter. The split of China 
Telecom will significantly affect the telecommunications sector, but its 
impact on stimulating significant competition is still in doubt, because the 
resulting companies will likely hold regional monopolies.40 The regulatory 
solutions outlined in the 2000 Telecommunications Regulations seem 
promising in the abstract, but past experiences have exposed major 
difficulties in policy implementation.41 For example, China Unicom, has 
experienced difficulties since its creation in 1994. These difficulties 
 
 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 364. 
 39. See id. 
Nor has BT remained idle in light of these market changes. In a direct response to such 
changes, BT cut domestic rates by $540 million during the first nine months of 1994. BT has 
continued to string more fiber-optic lines. BT’s service also markedly improved. The 
installation time for new phone lines has dropped from weeks to days. The majority of BT’s 
pay phones are now functional whereas roughly 60% were out of order at any given time 
prior to the introduction of competition.  
Id. 
 40. See Rachel Abramson, Catching Flies With Chopsticks, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 22 
(2002). 
In a massive restructuring that began and continues as we go to press, the hundred percent 
state owned monopoly China Telecom will split into northern and southern regional providers 
and merge with smaller data provider of data services in the north. Signs of this evolution 
began in March 1999, when China Telecom split into four competing service units: fixed-line 
telephone (China Telecom), mobile (China Mobile), paging (given to China Unicom), and 
satellite (ChinaSat). Rather than stirring competition, critics suggested this split would create 
new monopolies in each service area, or “supercarriers” surrounded by a competitive fringe.  
Id. at 22. See also China’s Telecommunications Reform Nears Completion, supra note 12, at 1. 
 41. Rachelle B. Chong and Wendy Chow, Financing Telecommunications Projects in Asia: A 
Promising Regulatory Perspective, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 14 (1999). “Even in its partially competitive 
markets, China’s regulatory requirements hinder competition.” Id. 
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occurred in its attempt to expand through foreign investment, its 
interconnection with the State-owned local network,42 and its attempts to 
license its cellular service.43 The problems in the China Telecom breakup 
and China Unicom case display the complexities and weaknesses of the 
current Chinese regulatory environment.44 Since the issuance of the 2000 
Regulations, Chinese telecommunications regulation has taken a more 
proactive stance. The duopoly system between China Telecom and China 
Unicom, created to cut into China Telecom’s monopoly, has done more to 
frustrate than develop a more competitive environment.45 Although MII 
has licensed China Unicom to provide all of its telecommunications 
services, Unicom has made only a slight impact in mobile 
communications, holding an eight percent market share.46 China 
 
 
 42. See generally Leontine D. Chuang, Investing in China’s Telecommunications Markets 
Reflections on the Rule of Law and Foreign Investment in China, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 509 
(2000).  
 43. See Xiongjian Liang & Yan Xu, Chapter Five: Policy and Regulations, in 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN CHINA 129-30 (Jintong Lin, Xiongjian Liang, & Yan Wan eds., 2001). 
“After China Unicom moved into the market, the MPT created many barriers to block the development 
of China Unicom.” Id. China Unicom experienced discriminatory treatment in access to mobile 
switching centers as Unicom was restricted to only one local network while such restriction was not 
applied to China Telecom. Id. at 130.  
 44. See Chuang, supra note 42, at 516. “The failure of [China Unicom’s] CCF foreign 
investment ventures with foreign investors is a perfect illustration of the risks created by China’s 
shifting regulatory environment and its weak legal framework.” Id. See also Jiang, supra note 42, at 
220. 
Ineffectual government support of competition stems from a lack of understanding of the 
significance of competition to the Chinese telecommunications industry and the failure to 
introduce feasible policies and rules of conduct to facilitate such competition. The confusion 
of the function of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications as a government organ with 
the management of China Telecom as an enterprise also has much to do with this situation.  
Id.  
 45. See Liang & Xu, supra note 43, at 144. 
The key problem lies less in the strategic competitive frailty of China Unicom but rather more 
in the somewhat immature and irregular regulatory framework which has effectively inhibited 
an aggressive and proactive stance on the part of the maturing company. Additionally, the 
existence of a duopoly system has frustrated the development of a more comprehensive 
telecommunications competition policy. Compared with the situation in such advanced 
countries such as the US and the UK, China still has to undertake an arduous deregulatory 
“long march.” The recent restructuring of the regulatory framework is just a small first step 
on the path.  
Id. 
 46. Id. at 143-44. 
China’s bold policy experiment with telecommunications deregulation should not be lightly 
discarded. The establishment of China Unicom was courageous and represented a 
discontinuous break with the past. Realistically, it must be admitted that, while China Unicom 
was licensed for all telecommunications services, competition has only taken place to date in 
mobile communications. The 8% market share of China Unicom in mobile communications is 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/16
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Telecom’s monopoly has not fundamentally changed, even after its 
separation into four competing service units (China Telecom, China 
Mobile, Guoxing, and China Satellite).47 The restructuring of the industry 
indicates that China is willing to undertake significant reforms towards 
stimulating competition and growth in the telecommunications market.48 
More importantly, the shortcomings of past policies and the current pro-
competition policy indicate further reform is necessary outside of the 
duopoly framework to foster sufficient competition.49 
The virtual monopoly of the telecommunications industry and the 
failure of the duopoly approach in spurring competition mirror the early 
telecommunications landscape in the United Kingdom. Before 1984, the 
telecommunications situation in the United Kingdom was characterized by 
high prices, poor service, and a government monopoly.50 In 1984, the 
British government undertook substantial liberalizing reforms to remedy 
 
 
admittedly small, although its activity in this field has contributed to the formation of a 
contestable market.  
Id. 
 47. Id. at 172, 177. “On February 14, 1999, . . . China Telecom was divided into four companies, 
each separately responsible for the operations of: fixed line telephony, mobile communications, 
wireless paging and satellite communications.” Id. at 172. Though competition has intensified in the 
mobile sector, China Telecom remains the dominant player in the fixed line telephone service. Id. at 
177.  
 48. See Chong & Chow, supra note 41, at 14-15. “Despite the many high regulatory hurdles in 
the China telecommunications market, there is a ‘new sophistication in the marketplace.’ Id. (citing 
Ken Zita, Will China Embrace Competition? Foreign Equity in Telecoms Hangs in the Balance, at 
http://www.ptc.org/plantptc/Zita-Ken/papershtm (last visited Jan. 17, 2004)). The Chinese government 
is beginning to realize that development of the telecommunications industry is vital to the growth of 
the economy and business sectors.” Id.  
 See also Sautede, supra note 14, at 34, 35. “From the 1980s on, the Chinese telecommunications 
sector became one of the priority sectors of economic development and it enjoyed considerable 
advantages, in line with the demands placed on it by the constitution of a strong national industry.” Id.  
 49. See Liang & Xu, supra note 43, at 144. 
Positive support to China Unicom by the MII since its establishment, the recently 
implemented reform of splitting China Telecom into four independent companies, and 
China’s expected entrance into the WTO, all give promise of a more liberalized 
telecommunication market. The recent establishment of a third operator, China Netcom 
Corporation, is clear evidence that China is fully determined on a more liberalized 
telecommunication market. With the opening of the world’s largest telecommunication 
market, it is not extravagant to claim that a new era of telecommunications deregulation for 
both China and the world, is approaching.  
Id. 
 50. Sir Bryan Carsberg, Telecommunications Competition in the United Kingdom: A Regulatory 
Perspective, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 285, 285-86 (1992). Sir Bryan Carsberg was the first Director 
General of OFTEL. Id. In 1981, a quarter of a million people in London were waiting for telephone 
service, the Post Office was not doing its job [and] had a complete monopoly over all aspects of 
telephone equipment and services.” Id.  
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the situation.51 These reforms included the privatization of BT, the 
creation of OFTEL, and the introduction of a second market competitor 
(Mercury).52 The duopoly approach, which began in 1984, was premised 
on the notion that the inclusion of a single competitor would alleviate the 
monopoly problem.53 This notion was proven faulty at the end of the 
seven-year period set for duopoly (1990) because Mercury did not 
compete significantly with BT.54 
Industry regulation substantially affects both competition and price 
control.55 In a perfect competition market with numerous competitors, 
competitors’ retail prices will not be much more than their marginal cost.56 
Conversely, in a monopoly, the monopolist ususally charges exploitative 
prices, well above cost.57 Hence, in a monopoly market, government 
 
 
 51. Id. at 286. The British government needed to liberalize the industry in order to make it 
function better.  
 52. See THATCHER, supra note 8, at 148.  
 53. See Carsberg, supra note 50, at 289.  
OFTEL began, in 1984, with the duopoly policy. The government’s idea was that if there 
were lots of competitors in the marketplace, they might all be weak and competition might 
fail. The approach, therefore, was that if we focused competition on one company—i.e., 
Mercury—we would have stronger competition and insure some level of success. Perhaps 
that was effective; it is impossible to tell whether it would have worked better if we had had 
more competitors from the beginning. We did start that way, however, and we have grown a 
strong competitor.  
Id. 
 54. See id.  
At the end of 1990, as we came to the end of the seven-year period set for duopoly, it was 
clear that we could not be content with that form of competition. The duopoly had been 
successful, but competition between two is not real competition—certainly not the kind that 
really makes the marketplace dynamic. OFTEL felt a strong need to push competition to the 
limit—not to decide as a regulator how much competition the market could sustain, but to let 
the market open up and use the opportunities.  
Id. See also Catherine Arnst & Gail Edmondson, The Global Free-For-All: As Huge Telecom Markets 
Open, Carriers Aim to Carve up the World, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 26, 1994, at 118. “Even if they 
suddenly sprout the gene for competition, most small carriers lack the resources to succeed on their 
own in a global market.” Id. 
 55. See JILL HILLS, DEREGULATING TELECOMS 28 (1986). 
Regulation can either involve setting the framework in which private enterprises operate, or it 
can mean detailed intervention in their affairs through the setting of their rates of return, or 
their tariffs or by decisions on which particular enterprises can enter a particular market, or 
what services may be offered. 
Id. 
 56. Id. at 30. “Traditional economic theory suggests that perfect competition in a market in 
which prices to the consumer will be lowered to the point at which they meet marginal costs of 
production will only occur if there are numerous companies in competition.” Id.  
 57. Id. “If one enterprise has a monopoly of the market its behavior is likely to be exploitative to 
consumers and prices will be fixed considerably above costs.” Id. 
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regulation of prices and market behavior is necessary to curb monopoly 
pricing, thereby benefiting the consumer by lowering prices.58  
However, competition in a market is not always the most efficient 
market structure. A natural monopoly can be the most favorable condition 
when a dominant firm alone supplies the market more efficiently and at a 
lower cost than in a market with competition.59 Although an industry may 
have all the signs of maximum efficiency in a natural monopoly structure, 
it is not necessarily the case that the most efficient structure is in fact a 
natural monopoly structure.60  
In a telecommunications market with a single dominant service 
provider, the telecommunications network has features of a natural 
monopoly because the duplication of complete networks is inefficient.61 A 
local fixed network tends toward a natural monopoly due to the economies 
of density.62 That is, it is cheaper to build a local network that supplies as 
 
 
 58. See HILLS, supra note 55, at 30. 
“[N]atural” monopolies have been considered to be in need of government regulation. 
Regulation by the government is intended to stop monopoly pricing and to benefit the 
consumer by lowering prices. What is in effect taking place is a transfer of wealth inasmuch 
as regulation is intended to benefit the consumer at the expense of the producer.  
Id. 
 59. See VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 52. 
The natural monopoly property makes monopoly the most efficient market structure. Natural 
monopoly is customarily said to prevail when a single firm can supply the market output at 
lower cost than any combination of firms. That customary definition corresponds to the 
normative concept that, when a natural monopoly exists, the socially optimal market structure 
is monopoly.  
Id. 
 60. See id. “The mere demonstration that a market possesses the property of normative natural 
monopoly does not imply that the market is a positive natural monopoly, and vice versa, the existence 
of a positive natural monopoly does not imply that the market possesses the property of normative 
natural monopoly.” Id. 
 61. John Vickers and George Yarrow, Telecommunications: Liberalisation and the Privatisation 
of British Telecom, in PRIVATISATION AND REGULATION: THE UK EXPERIENCE 223-24 (John Kayet 
al. eds., 1986). 
The nature of demand for communications is a major reason why natural monopoly is likely 
to be present in the running of networks. A person’s demand for the services of a 
telecommunications network depends upon who else subscribes to that network. If A wishes 
to call B (and/or hopes that B will call him), he must subscribe to the same network as B. This 
interdependence of demand means that supply of telecommunications services by two or 
more firms may be inefficient, and also that a supplier with many subscribers will tend to 
drive out suppliers with fewer subscribers if he can deny them interconnection on fair terms. 
The duplication of complete networks would obviously be inefficient, and so natural 
monopoly is likely.  
Id.  
 62. Mark Armstrong, Telecommunications, in COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 134 
(Dieter Helm & Tim Jenkinson eds., 1998). 
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many users as possible, spreading the cost to more consumers and thus 
providing a greater return on investment.63  
It is important to continue regulating the price structure for the 
dominant player in the telecommunications market to prevent exploitation 
of this natural monopoly power, and it is essential to provide a regulatory 
scheme that does not completely destroy incentives for the dominant 
player to become more efficient. It is also important that the scheme does 
not dissuade other potential competitors from joining the market to test 
whether the most efficient structure is a monopoly.64 
B. Applying Competition Policy to China 
Under the 2000 Telecommunications Regulations, telecommunications 
services in China are governed by a cost-based structure, known as rate-of-
return regulation (RORR).65 In traditional RORR pricing, the firm’s prices 
are set so that their total revenue covers their total cost, and the firm 
breaks even financially, earning a normal return on investment.66 In 
 
 
 63. Id. 
[I]t is cheaper per person to build a local network connection, say, 5000 people in a given 
area than it is to connect 500. (The reason is partly because the cost of a local exchange can 
be spread over more local users, and partly because the greater the use of remote 
concentrators and the like means that a lower proportion of the local network is made up of 
costly cabling and ducting.)  
Id.  
 64. See Carsberg, supra note 50, at 295. 
As long as there is a dominant operator in the marketplace, it is essential to continue 
regulation. The question then becomes: what is the right sort of regulation? One needs to 
choose regulatory devices for their incentive effects. If the first message is “promote 
competition as your first regulatory weapon,” the second is “let’s have incentive forms of 
regulation where we must have regulation.”  
Id.  
 65. See PRC, Telecommunications Regulations, art. 23. 
 66. Ronald R. Braeutigam, Price Caps in the U.S. Telephone Industry: How Real is Reform?, in 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 145, 147 (Donald L. Alexander ed., 1997). 
The determination of individual rate level can often be viewed as a two-step process, 
commonly known as fully distributed cost pricing. First, whatever costs can be directly 
attributed to a particular service are assigned to that service. Then, the remaining “common” 
costs, which cannot be allocated unamibiguously to individual services, are nevertheless 
assigned to individual services using some (inherently arbitrary) cost allocation formula. 
Id. See also id. at 148. 
Regulators sometimes designated noncompetitive markets as “core” markets. They could then 
apply a rate-of-return constraint to the set of core markets, requiring that the revenues 
generated in these markets cover no more than the share of costs allocated to these markets 
under fully distributed costing rules. Markets with relatively elastic demands (presumably 
because there are a good deal of competition in these markets) would then be designated as 
“noncore” markets, often free from constraints on pricing.  
Id. 
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assessing the costs, the regulatory authority uses the cost data submitted 
by the regulated company. 
There are several significant inefficient trends in the RORR pricing 
scheme. Because the regulated price provides a guaranteed normal return 
on investment, the regulated firm has little or no incentive to develop 
technology outside of the regulated market that might result in improved 
efficiency for its activities outside of the regulated market.67 Another 
major deficiency lies in the reporting of costs to the regulator for the 
purposes of pricing. Because price is based on the costs of the regulated 
firm, the firm may have an incentive to misreport and attribute much of its 
total cost to the regulated market.68 
1. The United Kingdom Model 
In determining the pricing structure of telecommunications services 
that would be implemented under the 1984 Telecommunications Act in the 
United Kingdom, the British researched the adoption of RORR, comparing 
the American model with an incentive-based scheme now commonly 
known as a price-cap regulation (PCR).69 Under the guidance of Sir Bryan 
Carsberg,70 a proponent of market dynamism and market-based approach, 
the United Kingdom chose to pursue PCR as the mechanism for pricing 
telecommunications services.71  
Under PCR, prices are regulated by linking a price ceiling to an 
independent economic variable.72 Prices increase at the rate of inflation, 
 
 
 67. Id. “The regulated firm may have an incentive to choose a technology that fails to minimize 
the total cost,” if the total costs of the new technology fall outside of the regulated market sphere. Id. 
Firms have little incentives to undertake economically efficient diversification into noncore markets. 
Id. 
 68. Id. at 149. 
If the firm has any ability to influence the categorization of costs as attributable or common, 
then the firm will have an incentive to misreport the categories. Specifically, the firm would 
like to report as attributable to the core [regulated market] services as large a portion of total 
costs as possible, since that would raise the amount of revenues allowable in the core markets.  
Id.  
 69. See VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 267. “In October 1982, the Department of 
Industry commissioned Stephen Littlechild to report on two proposals for regulating BT’s prices: rate-
of-return regulation on the U.S. model versus an incentive scheme designed by Sir Alan Walters, then 
the economic adviser to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.” Id. 
 70. See Farrell, supra note 35, at 331.  
 71. See VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 267-68. In 1983, Stephen Littlechild, 
commissioned by the Department of Industry to report on pricing regulations, recommended a “local 
tariff reduction scheme” which essentially mirrors PCR. Id. In 1984 OFTEL adopted Littlefield’s 
scheme with some modifications. Id. at 268. 
 72. See Braeutigam, supra note 66, at 151. 
Under the heading of “price-cap” or “price-adjustment” plans are a variety of schemes in 
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measured by the retail price index (RPI), less an unspecified adjustment 
factor (X).73 The British originally referred to this scheme as “RPI – X” 
and later renamed it “price-cap regulation” (PCR). PCR allows the prices 
of a regulated firm to be adjusted over a specified period of time in 
response to changes in factors, which the firm connot control. These 
factors (externalities), include changes in technology, consumer demand, 
and consumer price preferences.74 
A price ceiling is established to allow regulated firms to earn a 
reasonable rate of return and is set for a multi-year period of time, such as 
five, seven, or ten years.75 If within that period of time the regulated firm 
develops more efficient methods of reducing costs, while remaining below 
the price ceiling, the firm makes increased profits.76  
PCR provides incentives for cost reduction that are absent in RORR.77 
PCR permits the regulated firm to increase its rates to customers provided 
 
 
which “prices are regulated directly through the establishment of price caps, ceilings, bands, 
floors, inflation-based formulas or other rules as opposed to setting prices indirectly based on 
earnings.” As long as the ceiling on the individual rates (or an index of rates) to be charged in 
regulated markets is satisfied, the firm could be allowed to enter into and produce whatever 
output levels it desires in other (unregulated) markets.  
Id.  
 73. See VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 10 at 267. BT’s local telecommunications services 
were subject to price regulation where “prices on average would be allowed to grow at the rate of 
inflation minus an unspecified adjustment factor (X); . . . . Hence the scheme bore the name ‘RPI – X’ 
and was later called price-cap regulation in the United States.” Id. See also Howard E. Thompson, 
Price-Cap Regulation, Incentives for Cost Reduction, and Stockholder-Ratepayer Conflicts, in 
ECONOMIC INNOVATIONS IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 97 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1992).  
The productivity factor [or adjustment factor (X)] is the key element in the incentive 
mechanism. If cost reductions instituted by the utility exceed the productivity factor, then 
profits increase without an increase in real prices to the customers. The productivity factor 
determines the rule for sharing cost reductions between the customer and stockholder. A 
larger value for the productivity factor will transfer more of the cost reduction to the ratepayer 
than a smaller productivity factor.  
Id. at 98.  
 74. See Braeutigam, supra note 66, at 151-52. 
In its purest form, price-cap regulation would allow for a firm’s prices to be adjusted over 
time in response to changes in exogenous factors . . . [such as] . . . changes in prices paid for 
factors of production . . . changes in the state of technology utilized (but not developed) by 
the firm . . . demand for services . . . and income in the region and population.  
Id. at 151. 
 See Diagram infra, for the algebraic representation of PCR. See NORSWORTHY & JANG, supra 
note 11, at 219. “[I]ndustry costs will increase by the amount of an increase in input prices less any 
productivity growth, and plus any external factors that affect costs. Output prices PO are assumed to 
reflect cost changes.” Id. 
 75. See Carsberg, supra note 50, at 295. “The limit [price ceiling] is set with regard to allowing 
the regulated company to earn a reasonable rate of return, but it is not adjusted from year to year.” Id.  
 76. See id. “If the [regulated] company becomes more efficient than expected, it makes more 
profit.” Id. 
 77. See Thompson, supra note 73, at 98, 99. 
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the rate of increase is less than the standard rate of increase in prices.78 
Through the decoupling of prices charged by the regulated firm from 
profits earned, PCR creates an incentive for cost reduction.79 The price-
cap’s end result is to encourage greater efficiency and leaner competition, 
which tends to generate higher profits for the regulated firms.80  
Upon review of PCR’s effects on the British telecommunications 
market, it appears that BT has become a more efficient service provider 
and leaner competitor by investing heavily in modernization and an 
expanded network, while maintaining a consistently high rate of return.81 
Although BT’s share of the residential market has steadily decreased BT 
continues to expand into other areas while also improving its domestic 
service.82  
 
 
To see how the incentives might work, assume that utility management is compensated on the 
basis of the market value of the enterprise. Then the goal of management will be to maximize 
value . . . Management will proceed with cost reduction efforts so long as the net effect is to 
increase profit and hence value. If, however, it is not possible to keep the cost increase less 
than the revenue increase allowed by the general price level less the productivity factor, other 
incentives will prevail.  
Id. at 98, 99.  
 78. See id. at 98. “The basic idea [of PCR] is that, as long as the utility can keep the rate of 
increase of rates to customers less than the general rate of increase of prices, its earned rate of return 
should be of no interest to regulators or customers.” Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. See also Warren G. Lavey, Making and Keeping Regulatory Promises, 55 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 5 (2002). “Economists have focused on many principles and tools to improve the contributions of 
telecommunications regulations to enhancing consumer welfare and ‘efficiency.’” Id.  
 See also Lavey, supra note 80, at 6. “Moreover, maximum rates should be determined through 
incentive-based price caps rather than through rate-of-return, cost-based regulation. Economists argue 
that the application of these and other economic principles have added to the competitiveness, price 
decreases, and service improvements of telecommunications markets.” Id.  
 See also NORSWORTHY & JANG, supra note 10, at 218. “A utility that improves efficiency and 
responds to consumer demand effectively would see its profits rise.” Id.  
 81. See VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 272. “Over the seven-year duopoly period 
(1984 to 1991) BT had become a formidable competitor in two major respects. It had invested heavily 
in a modernized and expanded network, and it had restructured its prices.” Id. See also id. at 276. 
In the first ten years of BT’s price-cap regulation a monotonic trend has developed . . . the 
escalation of the X factor from RPI –3 to RPI –7.5 over a number of iterations is quite 
remarkable. From an optimistic perspective that shows the success of price-cap regulation in 
helping improve BT’s productivity while maintaining a consistently high rate of return, even 
in the midst of recession in the United Kingdom. That clearly leaves some room for 
stringency.  
Id. 
 82. See Farrell, supra note 35, at 365. BT expanded its international operations in response to 
domestic competition by buying a twenty percent stake in MCI. Id. BT’s service also improved, as 
installation time has dropped from weeks to days. Id.  
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2. The Competition Model in China 
The telecommunications landscape in China today nearly mirrors that 
of the United Kingdom two decades ago. The virtual monopoly of China 
Telecom in fixed-line domestic and long-distance service carries the same 
natural monopoly tendencies and effects that BT encountered in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.83 Like BT in 1984, China Telecom has moved 
toward privatization by publicly selling its shares.84 Privatization of China 
Telecom will be a key factor in the future success of PCR because a non-
government owned firm will be forced to find cost efficient processes to 
satisfy stockholders.85 The duopoly approach implemented in the United 
Kingdom exposed the difficulty of using competition as the sole tool for 
promoting efficiency in the telecommunications market.86 A 
comprehensive telecommunications regulatory law is on the horizon in 
China, following already significant reforms such as the recent creation of 
the MII in 1998 and the release of the Regulations in 2000.87  
III. PROPOSAL 
China should adopt the PCR pricing mechanism in telecommunications 
services to promote within China Telecom greater efficiency and leaner 
competition among its competitors. The Regulations mandate that pricing 
will be regulated by the government until the market becomes fully
 
 
 83. China Telecom, though splitting into two regional entities, will still continue to hold regional 
monopolies that carry the same problems of a national monopoly with regards to interconnection and 
the tendency toward natural monopoly. SeeAbramson, supra note 40.  
 84. Edward R. Leahy & Michael O’Brien, Telecommunications Law and Technology in the 
Developing World, 22 B.C. INTL’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 22 (1999). “The Chinese government sold 
shares in China Telecom and raised $4 billion in the initial public offering in October, 1997.” Id.  
 85. See id.  
 86. This relates to the failure of both China Unicom (PRC) and Mercury Communications (UK) 
in becoming viable competitors to the dominant players, China Telecom (PRC) and British Telecom 
(BT).  
 87. See Abramson, supra note 40, at 17-18. The creation of the Ministry of Information Industry 
and restructuring of telecommunications governance is significant as “it illustrates a significant shift in 
China’s telecom policy.” Id. See also id. at 18. The 2000 Telecommunications Regulations is “a 
preview of the anticipated comprehensive Telecommunications Law.” Id.  
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competitive.88 The British experience has shown that incentive-based 
pricing alongside a duopoly is an extremely effective method of promoting 
leaner competition and greater efficiency.89  
Because the telecommunications landscape in China today is similar to 
that of the United Kingdom in the early 1980s, China is in a good position 
to move towards PCR and follow the British model.90 The split of China 
Telecom into two companies should promote greater efficiency and leaner 
competition alongside the price-cap incentive mechanism.91  
One factor that might become a potential roadblock to price regulation 
in China is an underdeveloped independent regulator. In the case of the 
United Kingdom, OFTEL was pivotal in ensuring that price regulation was 
impartial and beyond political interference, ensuring a successful 
regulatory regime.92 As China’s telecommunications sector moves towards 
privatization, private shareholders will surely demand more legitimate, 
impartial and stringent oversight by a regulatory body.93 The MII has 
proved it is ready for the task of stringent oversight, especially in its recent 
handling of interconnection issues and WTO concerns.94 Furthermore, the 
MII has established several independent regulatory bodies at the provincial 
level under its direct national management, signaling a move toward 
 
 
 88. See PRC Telecommunications Regulations, art. 24. “Charges for basic telecommunications 
shall be fixed by the government, guided by the government, or regulated by the market . . . . Charges 
for telecommunications services for which there is sufficient competition in the market shall be 
regulated by the market.” Id.  
 89. See supra text accompanying note 81.  
 90. Both telecommunications markets (China and the UK in the 1980s) have a dominant player 
providing basic fixed-line and long-distance telephony service (China–China Telecom, UK–British 
Telecom), encouragement of a duopoly approach (China–China Telecom split today and the China 
Unicom in the past, UK–British Telecom and Mercury Communications). Both are moving toward 
establishing comprehensive regulatory reform. 
 91. The ability for each company to build in each other’s networks creates an incentive 
mechanism that will push the companies to expand beyond their own networks.  
 92. See Farrell, supra note 35, at 325.  
Bt’s privatization created a number of now regulatory concerns. One of the most pressing 
concerns was preventing BT from abusing its de facto monopoly power. However, the 
government also wanted to ensure that BT’s new, private shareholders could look forward to 
a regulatory regime with little or no political interference. The solution to both concerns took 
the form of a new regulator: the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL).  
Id.  
 93. See Abramson, supra note 40, at 23-24. “China Unicom and China Mobile have held initial 
public offerings (IPO) on the Hong Kong stock market. China Unicom sold over 20% of its market 
share . . . China Telecom is expected to announce the next telecom IPO despite repeated delays.” Id.  
 94. See Sautede, supra note 14, at 39. “Following the injunctions of the State Council, [the 
Ministry of Information Industry] has been especially vigilant about inter-connection problems, 
particularly because [of] the arrival of new operators.” Id. 
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greater regulatory managerial efficiency.95 WTO accession commitments 
mandate that the MII cannot control telecommunications operators and 
must be impartial with respect to all market participants.96 Compliance 
with its WTO commitments and continued MII development should pave 
the way for the MII to function much like OFTEL functions today. The 
effective management of PCR in China will depend upon the 
establishment of a truly independent regulatory agency.97  
The division of China Telecom did not significantly increase 
competition.98 The northern and southern parts from the split of China 
Telecom are the component parts.99 In telecommunications, competition 
between parts is limited, because the local networks have regional 
monopolies.100 Therefore, because each corporation would continue to 
hold a local monopoly, real competition is impossible. 
A final potential roadblock lies in the PCR mechanism itself. The “X,” 
or productivity factor, is a determined figure that considers cost and 
various external factors.101 Cost will continue to play a significant role in 
 
 
 95. Id.  
[T]he granting of licenses for both basic and value-added services between provinces is to be 
carried out nationally, but licenses for value-added services within any given province are 
granted by telecoms regulators provincially. (in August 2000, the Ministry of Information 
Industry established at the provincial level several “independent regulatory bodies” under its 
direct national management).  
Id. 
 96. See Sherman, supra note 4, at 225. 
In order to avoid the conflict of interest which arises when the body regulating the 
telecommunications industry is also the major telecommunications operator, the Reference 
Paper requires that the regulator be separate from, and not accountable to, any operator . . . 
Thus MII can continue to act as the regulator so long as it does not ‘control’ China Telecom, 
China Mobile, or the other government-owned telecommunications companies. But the 
regulator must be impartial with respect to all market participants. This specifically imposes a 
requirement not to favor government-owned or controlled companies.  
Id.  
 97. See Sautede, supra note 14, at 44. 
The provisions for the setting up of an “independent regulatory agency” (the allocation of 
licences, the powers to settle disputes and to sanction) will be particularly important as, while 
the opening up to foreign capital will be phased in gradually, liberalization of the sector 
requires that the various players be able very quickly to have recourse to other than a body 
that is both judge and party, to wit the MII.  
Id.  
 98. See Vickers & Yarrow, supra note 61, at 237.  
 99. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (stating that China Telecom has split into a 
northern and southern part). 
 100. See Vickers & Yarrow, supra note 61, at 237. “In telecommunications the scope for 
competition between the parts is limited. Local network A does not compete with local network B.” Id.  
 101. See Braeutigam, supra note 66, at 151-52. Factors outside of the firm’s control (externalities) 
include changes in technology, subscriber demand, and subscriber willingness to pay. Id. 
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the determination of “X,” bringing the same problems underlying RORR  
pricing, thereby making PCR potentially the equivalent of the scheme at 
fault.102 However, the results from PCR in the United Kingdom have 
proven otherwise.103 Apparently, the external factors keep “X” from 
approaching the old RORR cost figure. So long as China develops an 
independent and transparent regulator such as OFTEL, there should be 
similar positive results.104  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Though China is still in the early stages of comprehensive regulatory 
reform, the adoption of the PCR pricing mechanism is feasible and 
realistic.105 The United Kingdom was in a similar situation nearly two 
decades ago, and found success with PCR in promoting greater market 
efficiency and leaner competition.106 The telecommunications industry in 
China is currently at a crossroads. The long anticipated national 
comprehensive telecommunications law in China should replace the cost-
based (RORR) pricing scheme with PCR if China is to solve the 
competition dilemma posed by a monopolistic telecommunications 
landscape.  
 
 
 102. See Vickers & Yarrow, supra note 61, at 232. In determining BT’s “X” factor, cost would 
form the main basis for the determination of “X”. Id. “If ‘X’ is determined by reference to BT’s actual 
costs, we are back to rate-of-return regulation, with all its attendant problems . . . The point is not that 
Professor Littlefield’s scheme is at fault. It is that his scheme may end up being roughly equivalent to 
the schemes criticized. Thus the problems of rate-of-return regulation would appear to be hard to avoid 
in regulated private monopoly.” Id.  
 103. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. British Telecom has become a more efficient, 
proactive service provider and leaner competitor by investing heavily in modernization and an 
expanded network, while maintaining a consistently high rate of return. VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, 
supra note 10, at 272. 
 104. See Sherman, supra note 96, at 225. WTO accession commitments mandate that the MII 
cannot control telecom operators and must be impartial with respect to all market participants. Id. 
Compliance with its WTO commitments, and continued MII development should pave the way for the 
MII to function much like OFTEL functions today. Id. 
 105. See Carsberg, supra note 50, at 285. “The modern phase of UK telecommunication 
liberalization dates from 1981.” Id. The national comprehensive telecommunications law in the United 
Kingdom was passed in 1984. Id. at 286. See also Sautede, supra note 14, at 34-35. China has had 
even a longer period of time to ponder regulatory reform, since it began efforts to reform the industry 
in the 1980s. Id. “From the 1980’s on, the Chinese telecommunication sector became one of the 
priority sectors of economic development and it enjoyed considerable comparative advantages.” Id. at 
34.  
 106. See Carsberg, supra note 50, at 285–86.  
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Diagram: Price Cap Equation107 
POTEL – PITEL – TFPTEL + ZTEL 
POTEL = Percent change in the firm’s output prices. 
PITEL = Percent change in the firm’s input prices. 
TFPTEL = Percent change in the firm’s total factor productivity. 
ZTEL = Changes in the firm’s external costs. 
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